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Biodiversity reporting for governmental organisations: Evidence from English local 
councils
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to analyse the current nature and content of 
biodiversity reporting practices adopted by English local councils. By adopting a multi-
theoretical framework that relies on economic and social theories such as agency, 
stakeholder, legitimacy and institutional theories, this study also aims to investigate the 
factors that explain the extent of biodiversity disclosure provided by local councils.
Design/methodology/approach – This study uses a self-constructed disclosure index to 
analyse the biodiversity-related information published in the official websites of 351 
English local councils. A multivariate analysis was conducted to analyse the association 
between local councils’ characteristics and biodiversity disclosure.
Findings – This study shows that the information disclosed on local biodiversity is limited 
and does not allow the interested stakeholders to get a comprehensive picture of the current 
status of local biodiversity. It also provides evidence that the level of biodiversity disclosure 
is significantly associated with the level of local council’s population, the presence of 
councillors from environmentally-oriented parties and environmental non-governmental 
organisations operating in the local cou cil area, poor biodiversity management practices 
and local councils’ visibility.
Originality/value – This study is one of the few accounting studies that provides a 
comprehensive analysis of biodiversity disclosure by analysing its nature and content and 
investigating the factors associated with such disclosure. It extends agency, stakeholder, 
institutional and legitimacy theories, by showing that local councils use voluntary 
disclosures to satisfy the informational needs of the main stakeholders and to assure that 
their strategies and practices conform to the values and expectations of the community they 
represent.
Keywords: Biodiversity, England, Local councils, Voluntary disclosure
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Introduction
Biodiversity is essential for the survival of the human race and plays a central role in 
economic development. Flora, fauna and ecosystems provide fundamental support to human 
well-being. Despite knowing about biodiversity’s importance, humans have undertaken 
activities that contribute to ecosystem degradation resulting in biodiversity loss (Secretariat 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2014). These losses in biodiversity have caused a 
decline in human well-being, with some social groups being pushed into poverty. 
Supranational organisations like the United Nations and the European Commission are 
developin  strategies and action plans aimed at raising global awareness of biodiversity. 
These strategies, in particular, underline the need to integrate biodiversity considerations into 
organisations’ accounting and reporting systems, in both the private and public sector 
(Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010; EU, 2012). Organisations, as 
human constructs, should give an account of the impact of their activities on natural habitats 
and species and on the actions they have implemented to manage this issue (Jones, 1996, 
2003).
Organisations need to be accountable for environmental assets to the society at large as well 
as to their stakeholders (Jones, 2013). Organisations have a moral duty to maintain, enhance 
if possible, but certainly not deplete the world’s natural resources. They should act as 
stewards of the natural environment (Jones, 2003). This concept of environmental 
stewardship is very wide as it embraces not only current stakeholders but also the future 
generations of stakeholders. At its core is the principle that the current generation should pass 
onto the next generation natural resources at least equivalent to those inherited from the 
previous generation. Biodiversity accounting is one of the means that organisations can use to 
demonstrate their environmental stewardship. By accounting for biodiversity organisations 
can shape the way in which the impact of human activities on the biodiversity loss is 
perceived and understood by society (Jones and Solomon, 2013). In its broadest sense, 
accountability refers to the “giving and demanding of reasons for conduct in which people are 
required to explain and take responsibility for their actions” (Parker and Gould, 1999, p. 116). 
By reporting comprehensive information about the condition of the environmental assets they 
manage, the actions taken to conserve and protect them and the progress achieved, 
organisations discharge their accountability to the society. Biodiversity reporting allows the 
society and interested stakeholders to assess management’s stewardship of the natural 
environment (Jones, 1996). Such public assessment, in turn, encourages organisations to 
adopt actions to conserve and protect biodiversity effectively (Jones and Solomon, 2013).
Despite this importance, biodiversity has been almost neglected in the accounting literature 
(see Jones and Solomon, 2013). There are few studies on biodiversity accounting, most of 
them address technical accounting problems of how to establish accountability mechanisms 
for corporations and how to account for biodiversity. These issues have generally been 
addressed theoretically, with the attempt to create a framework for biodiversity accounting 
(Davies, 2014; Houdet, 2008; Houdet et al.; 2009; Jones, 1996; Tregidga, 2013), or with 
single case studies (Jones and Matthews, 2000; Jones, 2003; Cuckston, 2013; Siddiqui, 2013; 
Kahn, 2014). Biodiversity reporting has been the focus of recent studies, most of them 
focused in the corporate sectors (Adler et al., 2017, Adler et al. 2018; Atkins et al., 2014; 
Boiral, 2016; Gaia and Jones, 2017; Rimmel and Jonall, 2013; Samkin et al., 2014; Schneider 
et al., 2014; Van Liempd and Busch, 2013; Weir, 2018).
Governmental organisations have been generally neglected by the literature on environmental 
and biodiversity accounting, despite the fact that they are directly accountable to the public 
for delivering sustainable development (Ball and Grubnic, 2007). Governmental 
organisations have a historical role as a “steward of the environment” (Lewis, 2000). They 
have “a civic responsibility to properly manage public goods, resources, and/or facilities in a 
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way that supports sustainable development objectives and promotes the public interest” (GRI, 
2005, p. 7). Biodiversity is a core component of a sustainable development and has an 
important role to play in developing sustainable communities. In England, the Natural 
Environment and Rural Communities Act places a ‘biodiversity duty’ on public authorities. 
Under the ‘biodiversity duty’, public authorities must show regard to the conservation of 
biodiversity in exercising their function (NERC Act, 2006). Biodiversity loss is a global 
phenomenon, whose impact goes far beyond the local administrative boundaries. Meanwhile, 
biodiversity conservation is mainly a local issue and local governments are the guardians of 
these natural resources. They manage large public areas of land, much of which contains 
important biodiversity values, and are responsible for planning and regulating many activities 
which have an impact on biodiversity. The decisions that local councils make in regards to 
biodiversity directly affect the well-being of the communities they represent. Local councils 
are accountable to such communities. These communities have the right to know about the 
status of local biodiversity, the actions undertaken to conserve and protect biodiversity, as 
well as the progress achieved. Local councils have the duty to meet these disclosure 
expectations (GRI, 2005) and to discharge their accountability to the community. 
Consequently, biodiversity reporting is a topic relevant to both academics and policymakers.
By analysing the population of English local councils, this research study aims to achieve two 
purposes. First, it explores how biodiversity-related information is disclosed in the public 
sector, by developing a comprehensive disclosure index. Greater transparency on local 
biodiversity creates more informed societies, increases the understanding of the biodiversity 
impact and also transforms attitudes and behaviour in relation to biodiversity (Jones and 
Solomon, 2013). Second, this paper investigates which factors are associated with the level of 
biodiversity disclosure provided by local councils.
This article makes a number of key contributions to the existing body of knowledge. First, it 
adds to the environmental reporting literature by investigating biodiversity reporting, a 
neglected area in the public sector accounting literature. Previous studies on environmental 
and biodiversity reporting have mainly focused on the private sector (Ball and Grubnic, 
2007), whereas the public sector has been less researched (Ball, 2004). With the exemption of 
Siddiqui (2013); Raar (2014), Samkin et al. (2014), Schneider et al. (2014), Barut et al. 
(2016); Gaia and Jones (2017)  and Weir (2018) who studied biodiversity reporting practices 
within public sector organisations, previous studies have nly analysed biodiversity reporting 
in the corporate sector. Second, it empirically investigates the potential determinants of 
biodiversity disclosure. With the exceptions of Rimmel and Jonall (2013) and Adler et al 
(2018), previous studies on biodiversity reporting have not investigated which factors 
influence the extent of biodiversity reporting. This study is, to the best of our knowledge, the 
first one to investigate the determinants of biodiversity disclosure in organisations operating 
in the public sector. Unlike Rimmel and Jonall (2013) who investigate the reasons behind 
biodiversity disclosure on the basis of interviews with corporate representatives, this study 
uses multivariate analysis to relate the extent of biodiversity disclosure to the potential 
explanatory variables. Third, this study responds to the call for more examination of the 
underlying arguments of legitimacy theory in the public sector (Burritt and Welsh, 1997; 
Frost and Seamer, 2002), as it relies on a multi-theoretical framework composed of agency, 
stakeholder, legitimacy and institutional theories to explain the extent of biodiversity 
disclosures among local authorities.
The remainder of this paper has four sections. The second section describes the theoretical 
framework and the hypotheses development, while section 3 illustrates the research 
methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results. And finally, the discussion of the 
results and the main conclusions are reported in Section 5.
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2. Theoretical Framework and hypotheses development
A unanimously accepted theoretical framework of the underlying determinants of voluntary 
disclosure still does not exist (Gray et al. 1995, Verrecchia, 2001; Cormier et al., 2005). The 
only wholly unifying assumption among different theories is that organisations are likely to 
disclose information that is favourable to them and unlikely to disclose information that is 
unfavourable to them (Dye, 2001). Several theoretical approaches have been used to explain 
the voluntary disclosure of both financial and non-financial information, in public and private 
contexts. In the context of social and environmental disclosure, Gray et al. (1995) identified 
economically-oriented theories and socially-oriented theories as the most recurrent theoretical 
approaches adopted. 
Economic-oriented theories are mainly based on agency theory, which believes that 
organisations use social and environmental disclosure to reduce agency costs that could arise 
in the form of political costs (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Zimmerman, 1977). Agency 
problems exist whenever there is a delegation of decision-making authority from a principal 
to an agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency problems thus exist in all organisational 
contexts: in firms between shareholders and managers and in governmental authorities 
between politicians and citizens (Zimmerman, 1977). Politicians, such as local governments, 
might use the voluntary disclosure of information to reduce the information asymmetry with 
the citizens and reduce the extant agency conflict.
Social theories, such as institutional, legitimacy and stakeholder theories are considered those 
that provide the most comprehensive framework for social and environmental disclosure 
(Gray et al. 1995; Cornier et al 2005). These three theories are neither separate nor competing 
but largely overlapping (Deegan and Blomquist 2006; Deegan, 2007). Institutional theory 
posits that organisations cannot be studied in isolation from the political, social and 
institutional context within which the organisation operates as they both are influenced by it 
and influence it (Cornier et al 2005; Deegan, 2002). Organisational practices do not develop 
in a vacuum, as organisations are embedded in a nexus of formal and informal rules. Social 
and environmental disclosure is the result of macro social processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). Both stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory share the assumptions of institutional 
theory that organisational practices (such as social and environmental disclosure) are 
influenced by the values of the context in which the organisation operates. They provide 
consistent but slightly different explanations for social and environmental disclosure 
(Deegan, 2007). 
Legitimacy theory argues that organisations must act within the boundaries of the societies in 
which they operate consider acceptable (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). The greater the 
likelihood of negative social perceptions of organisational activities, the greater the 
organisations’ desire to gain or maintain legitimacy. Organisations seeking legitimacy try to 
ensure that they operate within the norms of their societies and will adopt strategies and 
practices that are congruent with social values, expectations and norms (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). The need for legitimacy is usually associated with highly contested topics such as 
social and environmental issues (Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; 
Patten, 1991). Legitimacy theory considers the disclosure of voluntary information as a 
means by which organisations that want to gain or maintain legitimacy can potentially 
influence external perceptions of the organisation and public opinion (Deegan, 2007; 
Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). 
Stakeholder theory suggests that social and environmental disclosure is used as a mechanism 
to show the accountability of an organisation toward its stakeholders (Deegan, 2002; Gray et 
al., 1996). The accountability duties of local governments toward their stakeholders exceed 
those in the business sector. Local government officials act as agents of the citizens that 
elected them. They must be accountable to the society for the authority they exercise (Barton, 
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2005). The disclosure of information about how the local area is managed represents a means 
to manifest their accountability to the stakeholders. Stakeholder theory expands legitimacy 
theory as it helps to identify which stakeholder group expectations the organisation should 
take into accounts in order to comply with its social contract (Gray et al., 1996). Because of 
the many similarities between institutional, legitimacy and stakeholder theories any attempt 
to treat them as separate theories would be wrong (Deegan, 2007; Gray et al., 1995). 
Cormier et al. (2005) noted that the empirical findings on the determinants of social and 
environmental reporting (see Jones et al. 1995 for a review) raise the concern that any single 
theory is not capable of adequately explaining social and environmental disclosures. If the 
research questions are conjectured from only one theoretical perspective, the richness of 
understandings which can be obtained from combining different theoretical perspectives is 
lacking. A wider theoretical framework that combines different theoretical perspectives might 
enhance our understanding of social and environmental disclosures (Cormier et al., 2005; 
Gray et al., 1995). For these reasons, we have adopted a multi-theoretical framework that 
relies on economic and social theories, respectively agency theory and stakeholder, 
legitimacy and institutional theories, to explain the extent of biodiversity disclosures among 
local authorities. However, it has been argued the use of a theoretical framework based on 
different perspectives might challenge conceptual clarity and create difficulties in integrating 
the various perspectives into a coherent theoretical framework (Bello and Kostova, 2012). 
Therefore, to address this issue, we followed Bello and Kostova (2012) and limited our 
study’s theoretical perspectives to the most essential ones in light of our research questions. 
We also paid attention to the interactive effects and complementary of the different theories 
used. We focused on agency, legitimacy, stakeholder, and institutional theories because they 
are the most recurrent theoretical approaches adopted to study environmental disclosures (see 
Cormier et al., 2005; Gray, 1995) and because legitimacy, stakeholder, and institutional 
theories are complementary in nature (Deegan, 2007; Gray et al., 1995). 
2.1. Voluntary disclosure and the demand of information
Local councils are organisations governed by politicians. The relationship between local 
councils’ politicians and citizens can be described as an agency relationship whereby the 
citizens are the principals and the politicians are the agents (Zimmerman 1977). One of the 
primary functions of accounting is the production of information for external users who have 
no access to the information. The disclosure of such information is considered as an 
instrument to reduce the information asymmetry between agents and principals and mitigate 
the associated agency conflicts (Healy and Palepu, 2001). An increase in the population of a 
local council increases information asymmetry, as there are more citizens not directly 
involved in the administration of the local area. The demand and, therefore, the disclosure of 
information will be higher in local councils with a higher population (Zimmerman 1977). The 
activities undertaken by local councils on the management of local biodiversity affect several 
areas of the local community and have an impact on the well-being of the council’s 
population. This population has the right be informed about the state of local biodiversity 
even when there is no legal obligation for the local government to do so (Schneider et al., 
2014). Highly populated local councils might thus be subject to greater pressures from their 
citizens to provide information about the strategies adopted to preserve local biodiversity. 
Moreover, previous studies indicate that the availability of financial and managerial resources 
is pivotal to support planning in the public sector (Berke et al, 1996). In contrast with more 
traditional public functions, environmental conservation policies suffer from a lack of 
financial and managerial resources, as they are less established and their importance is less 
generally accepted (Ring, 2002). In most countries, financial resources are allocated to local 
councils on the bases of the number of inhabitants and using weighting factors that increase 
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with the population size. The more inhabitants a local councils has, the higher the amount of 
financial resources that are transferred to it (DCLG, 2013). Highly populated local councils 
tend also to have higher tax base and rates and, thus, the availability of more financial 
resources (Damanpour and Schneider, 2006). Previous studies noted that smaller local 
councils are more likely to lack staff capacity and thus do not have the ability to implement 
more advanced administrative initiatives (Berke et al. 1999). Meanwhile, highly populated 
local councils have a better ability to attract newcomers by maintaining low taxes through 
adopting cost saving programmes and attracting more professional staff (Damanpour and 
Schneider, 2006). For these reasons, it can also be argued that highly populated local councils 
have greater ability to obtain more financial and managerial resources which might lead them 
to adopt and implement more environmental conservation initiatives, such as biodiversity 
conservation, and disclose related information. Thus, we expect the following hypothesis:
H1: There is a positive relationship between the size of the population served by local 
councils and the level of disclosure of biodiversity information
2.2. Voluntary disclosure and political competitions
The main premise of agency theory in the political context is that the interest of voters and 
politicians are not perfectly aligned, so that the latter might have the incentive to put in place 
actions that the former might dislike (Ferejohn, 1999). In public sector organisations, 
elections represent the main political accountability mechanisms. In line with the assumption 
of agency theory, disclosure can be used by local councils’ governing groups as a matter of 
communication to show that they are honouring the promises made to their voters during the 
electoral campaigns, as their re-election depends on elector’s satisfaction (Giroux, 1999). The 
pressure to meet electors’ demands for local councils’ politicians is higher when their 
political opposition is powerful (Downs, 1957). Stronger political oppositions are likely to 
monitor closely the governing group and inform the public opinion of any deviation from 
their electoral promises, in order to reduce the governing group’s electoral support in the 
following elections (Baber and Sen, 1984). In this situation the political party in power is 
subject to higher external pressures to disclose more information to the general public 
(Laswad et al., 2005). In this way they can demonstrate to their electors that they are adopting 
effective policies and are maintaining the promises made to them during the electoral 
campaign. Hence, we expect that:
H2: There is a positive relationship between the level of political competition within the local 
councils and the level of disclosure of biodiversity information.
2.3. Voluntary disclosure and political ideology
Politicians base their political actions and election programs on an ideology. Different parties 
have different political agendas which are based on the party’s ideology. For politicians it is 
important to be considered legitimate and credible, especially among their voters (Tagesson 
et al., 2013) as they need their support for re-election. The voting preferences of citizens are 
indicative of the issues on which they hold the local councils to account. The greater the 
presence in the local council of councillors elected from parties whose political manifesto 
gives prominence to environmental values, the greater the importance of environmental 
values for the citizens the local council represents. Local councils composed of councillors 
from environmentally-oriented political parties are thus likely to develop policies that place 
more importance on environmental issues, as this will help them to get support from their 
voters. Politicians increase the level of disclosure in order to obtain voters’ trust (Ferejohn, 
1999). In line with the assumptions of institutional and legitimacy theories, they might 
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develop disclosure strategies in line with the environmental values of the context they are 
managing to show conformity with the values of the citizens that voted them, and they 
represent and maintain and improve their legitimacy with their voters. Local councils with a 
higher proportion of councillors elected from environmentally-oriented political parties will 
be keener to implement higher levels of transparency on biodiversity-related information. 
This will show to the community they represent that they share the same environmental 
values as them. Thus, we expect that:
H3: There is a positive relationship between the presence in the local councils of councillors 
from environmentally-oriented political parties and the level of disclosure of biodiversity 
information.
2.4. Voluntary disclosure and environmental NGOs
Stakeholder theory suggests that stakeholders’ monitoring organisations activities increases 
the likelihood that organisations disclose more information (Roberts, 1992). The disclosure of 
voluntary information represents a tool that organisations can use to discharge their 
accountability toward their stakeholders (Gray et al., 1996). Among the various organisations 
stakeholders, NGOs are one of the most powerful stakeholders who are concerned about the 
information that organisations disclose to the general public (Kim and Lyon, 2011). NGOs 
are non-profit organisations working for common welfare representing the views of groups of 
citizens with similar interests on specific issues (such as the environment). Their primary 
objective is to influence the policies adopted by public authorities and businesses (O’Dwyer 
et al. 2005). They have been found to impact organisations’ social and environmental 
behaviour and influence them to disclose more information (Campbell, 2007; Deegan and 
Blomquist, 2006; Doh and Guay, 2006; O’Dwyer et al. 2005). At a policy level, several 
studies have provided empirical evidence that policymakers are receptive to demands from 
environmental groups (Cress and Snow, 2000). Biodiversity conservation has become 
nowadays increasingly important for Environmental NGOs, with most of them undertaking 
initiatives aimed at conserving wild and domesticated fauna and flora. When such 
organisations are present in the local councils’ area, local councils might be more active on 
biodiversity conservation and communicate more biodiversity-related information. We thus 
expect the following hypothesis:
H4: There is a positive relationship between the presence of environmental NGOs in the area 
managed by the local councils and the level of biodiversity disclosure.
2.5. Voluntary disclosure and poor biodiversity management
Voluntary disclosure can be provided by organisations to achieve legitimacy (Dowling and 
Pfeffer, 1975). Organisations seeking legitimacy try to ensure that they operate within the 
norms of their respective societies by adopting strategies and practices that conform to 
societal norms, values, and expectations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). An organisation’s 
legitimacy is threatened when the organisation is a poor environmental performer. Such 
organisations face more social pressures and might use environmental disclosure in order to 
restore their legitimacy and reduce the social concerns about their environmental 
performance (Clarkson et al, 2008). Local councils who manage areas that suffer from 
biodiversity deterioration are subjected to a greater external criticism on their sustainable 
management strategies. They might, therefore, voluntarily choose to disclose biodiversity-
related information in order to reduce such criticism and restore their legitimacy within the 
society in which they operate. Thus, we expect that:
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H5: There is a positive relationship between local councils’ poor biodiversity management 
and the level of disclosure of biodiversity information.
2.6. Voluntary disclosure and local council’s visibility
A visible organisation attracts a disproportionate share of scrutiny by politicians, organised 
groups and the general public. This makes the organisation a potential for political action 
since they attract more attention from stakeholders than less visible organisations (Lim and 
McKinnon, 1993; Powell 1991). Legitimacy theory suggests that public visibility provides a 
strong incentive for organisations to provide voluntary information (Frost and Semaer, 2002; 
Patten, 1991). Visible organisations are more affected by social constraints and pressures than 
non-visible organisations (Belkaoui and Karpik 1989). They are also subjected to greater 
scrutiny from interested stakeholders and are usually under higher media coverage than less 
visible organisations (Neu et al, 1998). In such cases, more pressure is put on them to 
disclose information (Patten, 1991). Social and environmental disclosure can be used by 
visible organisations to respond to such pressure (Guthrie and Parker, 1989) and as a 
proactive method to influence the society in which they operate (Roberts, 1992). It is thus 
reasonable to assume that local councils with a higher visibility disclose more biodiversity-
related information as they are subject to a greater pressure to maintain or increase their 
legitimacy. Hence, we expect that:
H6: There is a positive relationship between the visibility of local councils and the level of 
disclosure of biodiversity information.
2.7. Summary 
Our set of hypotheses has been developed starting from the assumptions of agency and 
stakeholder theories which have been then complemented by institutional and legitimacy 
theories. Politicians are linked to the citizens they represent and the other stakeholders 
because of an agency stakeholder relationship where politicians act as the agents of the 
citizens and the other stakeholders. The wealth of citizens and stakeholders is affected by the 
actions that politicians undertake. Politicians could be self-interested and develop political 
strategies and actions aimed at pursuing their personal interests rather than the interests of the 
citizens or the other stakeholders (Zimmerman, 1977). The disclosure of public information 
can be thus used by politicians to manage their relationships with their citizens and the other 
stakeholders to show them that the political actions adopted are in line with their interests. In 
line with agency and stakeholder theories, the incentive for politicians to disclose information 
increases when the demand for disclosure is higher. This is because of the presence of more 
citizens or more interested stakeholders on biodiversity, or when politicians are pressured 
from strong political oppositions to please their voters to maintain their political support. The 
incentives of politicians to provide citizens and other stakeholders with relevant information 
might stem from the monitoring role played by these actors. However, these incentives might 
also result from the importance for politicians to show that they consider the local 
institutional context and the values of the citizens and stakeholders they represent, and to 
maintain legitimacy among these citizens and stakeholders. Thus, in line with institutional 
theory the incentive to disclosure biodiversity information becomes more prominent in 
communities that give more importance to environmental values, as politicians have the need 
to show conformity with the value of the community they represent. While, in line with 
legitimacy theory, this incentive becomes more prominent in more visible councils or in 
councils that do not perform well from a biodiversity perspective, as in such cases there is a 
greater public scrutiny, a major threat to these councils’ legitimacy. 
Page 8 of 41Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal9
3. Research Methodology
3.1. Sample and data gathering
To analyse biodiversity reporting in the public sector and investigate the potential 
determinants of biodiversity disclosure we analysed the disclosure practices adopted by the 
entire population of 353 English local councils.1
We investigated biodiversity disclosure by analysing the information disclosed by local 
councils in the biodiversity and/or natural environment conservation pages available in their 
official websites and in the biodiversity reports, biodiversity strategic documents and 
biodiversity action plans published in their website. We chose to analyse disclosure on 
websites as the internet provides more possibilities for organisations to increase their 
accountability toward their stakeholders, as it gives stakeholders access to information 
quickly and easily (Armstrong, 2011). Moreover, this also answers the call of Lodhia et al. 
(2004) for more studies on social and environmental disclosure on internet to complement the 
research into conventional annual reports.
To investigate the determinants of the extent of biodiversity disclosure we collected data 
from different sources. Local councils’ population and area size were gathered from the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) databases which is the UK’s largest independent 
producer of official statistics. Data about the size and conditions of local protected areas was 
gathered from Natural England, an executive non-departmental public body, sponsored by the 
Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs. Information about local environmental 
NGOs was gathered from Charity Choice, the UK’s largest charity directory. Local 
councillors’ political composition was obtained from the www.gwydir.demon.co.uk website, 
while local councils’ financial data was sourced from the Government National Statistics 
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics.
Because of missing data for two local councils, our final sample is composed of 351 local 
councils.
3.2. Institutional setting
3.2.1. Local councils in England
Local governments in England work within the powers laid down under various Acts of 
Parliament. Most of the services provided by local councils are based on mandatory 
requirements. Some of these services are tightly controlled by the central government, 
resulting in a similar level of service across the country. In other cases, local councils have 
some choice over the level and type of service they provide. Since the Local Government Act 
2000, local councils have responsibility for the economic, social and environmental 
wellbeing of their area.
The structure of English local councils varies from area to area. They can operate under either 
a two-tier or a one-tier structure. In most of England, local councils have a two-tier structure, 
with responsibility for council services split between the two tiers: county and district. 
County councils cover the entire county area and provide most of the services in such areas 
(like education, fire and public safety, libraries, planning, social care, trading standards, 
transport and waste management). Each district council covers a smaller area and provides 
mainly local services (like council tax collections, housing, planning applications, recycling 
and rubbish collection). Local councils that operate under a one-tier structure are less 
diffused. They can be of three main types: unitary authorities, London boroughs and 
metropolitan districts. One-tier local councils usually provide all the local services listed 
above, except in London and in metropolitan areas where some services, like fire, police and 
1 There are 353 local councils in England divided in 27 county councils, 201 district councils, 32 London 
boroughs, 36 metropolitan districts, 55 unitary authorities and two sui generis unitary authorities.
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public transport, are provided through ‘joint authorities’. Local councils are made up of 
democratically elected councillors who together represent the community in their jurisdiction. 
All councillors are members of the full council which sets the council’s vision and direction. 
Local councils are run on a system similar to that of central government, with a small number 
of councillors that form a cabinet, or executive board, in charge of the decision-making 
process and the other councillors being active in performing overviewing and monitoring 
activities.
Local councils are funded by grants received from central government, council tax and 
business rates. Central government provides grants to enable local authorities to deliver all 
the mandatory services. The amount of the grant a local council receives is based on the 
number and value of properties in the area and on the cost to provide services there. The 
council tax provides about a quarter of local funding. The level of the council tax is set on the 
base of the overall budget for the year. Local councils also obtain income from investments, 
council rents, sales and/or charges for discretionary services.
3.2.2. The local government biodiversity duty
In England, local councils have a responsibility to protect preserve and enhance biodiversity 
under the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act (NERC) 2006 and the National 
Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) 2012. Section 40 of the Natural Environment and Rural 
Communities Act (NERC) 2006 places a ‘duty’ on all public authorities to have regard to the 
conservation of biodiversity in exercising their functions. This ‘duty’ affects all public 
authorities in England, which include public bodies, local government and statutory 
undertakers. The key purpose of this duty is to raise the profile and visibility of biodiversity, 
clarify existing commitments with regard to biodiversity, and to make consideration of 
biodiversity an integral part of policy and decision making throughout the public sector 
(DEFRA, 2007). Implementing the ‘biodiversity duty’ requires local councils to ensure that 
biodiversity is protected and enhanced. This is done by contributing to the achievement of the 
aims of Biodiversity Action Plans, key biodiversity indicators and targets and also by 
incorporating biodiversity considerations into all the decisions related to relevant service 
areas and functions. In particular, local councils need to take biodiversity considerations into 
account in the development and delivery of key policies/strategies, planning systems and 
licensing schemes that have an impact on land use and the environment. They also have to 
consider the impact that the development of new infrastructures and the management of lands 
and buildings that impact wildlife sites will have on biodiversity. Moreover, the biodiversity 
duty requires that local councils develop awareness raising activities aimed at influencing the 
attitudes of people, businesses and land managers toward biodiversity conservation (DEFRA, 
2007).  
The National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) sets out planning policies which local 
planning authorities should have regard to on biodiversity matters. It states that the planning 
system should contribute not only to conserving existing biodiversity but also to enhancing or 
restoring, where possible, the habitats rich in biodiversity. In this way, local councils can 
make a significant contribution to the achievement of the commitments made by the UK 
Government. In the UK, biodiversity policy is a devolved responsibility: England, Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland have developed their own biodiversity or environment strategies. 
The Biodiversity strategy for England was published in 2011 with the mission “to halt overall 
biodiversity loss, support healthy well-functioning ecosystems and establish coherent 
ecological networks, with more and better places for nature for the benefit of wildlife and 
people” (DEFRA, 2011, p. 4). According to this strategic document, the mission will be 
achieved by: a) adopting a more integrated large-scale approach to conservation; b) engaging 
more people in biodiversity issues so that they are aware of the importance of biodiversity 
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and what they can do to help; c) reducing environmental pressure by ensuring that 
biodiversity considerations are taken into account by decision-makers within sectors which 
directly influence biodiversity and d) improving the knowledge on the current status and 
trends in biodiversity (DEFRA, 2011, p. 5).  
Local action for biodiversity is considered to be essential to achieve the strategy’s objectives. 
In particular, the strategic document encourages local councils to use local planning to 
support the creation of nature improvement areas, by identifying them in their local plans, to 
take a more active and positive role in the management of local sites, and to report data about 
the state of these sites (DEFRA, 2011, pp. 19-20). 
No specific legal obligation to report biodiversity-related information exists for English local 
authorities. However, according to the Environmental Information Regulations (EIR) 2004, 
which administers access to environmental information held by public authorities, local 
authorities should make environmental information available proactively, using easily 
accessible electronic means whenever possible. This means that councils should make the 
information available online.  The state of biodiversity and its components is considered as 
environmental information according to the European Directive 2003/4/EC. The minimum 
information to be routinely published includes policies, plans and procedures relating to the 
environment, reports on the state of the environment, and environmental impact studies. It 
also includes data taken from monitoring activities and risk assessments that affect or are 
likely to affect the environment. Thus, there is a general obligation for local authorities to 
publish information on the local biodiversity, although no specific requirements exist on the 
content of such information, the format or the period in which this information should be 
released.
3.2.3. Biodiversity status in England
The loss of biodiversity is widespread at national and international level - with a number of 
different species becoming extinct in England in recent years. To halt biodiversity loss, the 
Biodiversity strategy for England has been set together with a set of biodiversity indicators 
that track the progress of the achievement of the strategy objectives. These biodiversity 
indicators comprise 24 indicators and 51 measures which are assessed both in in the long-
term and in the short-term2. Since 2012, when these indicators were developed, the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has published an annual report where 
biodiversity indicators are updated with the most recent data. The report published in 
December 2015 (DEFRA, 2015) shows a general improvement of biodiversity indicators and 
measures, in both the long term and the short term. In particular, this relates to the objective 
of improving the knowledge on the current status and trends in biodiversity. The indicators 
show an increase in the number of records added every year to the Biodiversity Network 
Gateway and in the number of publicly accessed records (DEFRA, 2015, p. 191). 
The increase in the availability of this information is very important as it allows a more 
widespread understanding about the distribution of habitats and species which can help 
decision makers to take more informed decisions on how to protect English wildlife. 
Important achievements have also been recorded in relation to the objective of reducing 
environmental pressure. The DEFRA report shows that the percentage of sensitive habitat 
affected by air pollution is decreasing, as well as the presence of harmful substances in the 
marine environment, while the hectares of lands targeted by environmental management 
scheme agreements are increasing ((DEFRA, 2015, p. 157-190). In relation to the objective 
of engaging more people in biodiversity issues, the DEFRA report (DEFRA, 2015, pp. 136-
2 Please see the DEFRA website at https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/england-biodiversity-indicators 
for more information about these indicators and measures. 
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156) shows that in 2015 26% of English people engaged with biodiversity conservation 
activities. It also shows that people are spending more time in volunteering activities aimed at 
improving environmental conditions in comparison to the start of the millennium. However, 
less time was spent in comparison to the previous five years. 
The report also shows that the financial resources devolved to biodiversity conservation have 
significantly increased from the beginning of the millennium, reaching a peak of £ 450 
million in 2009, right before the year of Biodiversity. However, since then there has been a 
steady decrease in the public spending which in 2015 stopped at nearly £ 350 million. This is 
not promising, as without adequate financial support biodiversity conservation actions cannot 
be pursued. Some important improvements have been achieved in relation to the objective of 
adopting a more integrated large-scale approach to conservation, although some areas of 
concerns still exist in this area. 
The report shows a drastic reduction in the abundance and diversity of species in the wider 
countryside, a higher concentration of pollinators in specific areas which might negatively 
affect their ability to contribute to ecosystem services. However, on the other hand, the extent 
and condition of protected areas and local sites has been improved. This is especially true in 
relation to the acres of protected sea areas and the percentage areas of Sites of Special 
Scientific Interest (SSSI) in favourable or recovering conditions. The percentage area of 
SSSIs in favourable or recovering conditions has increased substantially from 65% in 2003 to 
95% since 2011. There are now 4,000 SSSIs in England, covering about 7% of its area and 
evenly distributed across the country. Figure 1 shows a map of England that classifies its 
local councils in accordance with the status of the SSSIs located in the local councils’ area. 
INSERT FIGURE 1
The map shows that in 2015 the majority of English councils have SSSIs with a percentage 
area in favourable or recovering conditions equal or greater than 95%. However, very few 
councils have SSSIs with a percentage area in favourable or recovering conditions equal to 
100%. The map also shows that several councils administrate areas where SSSI conservation 
status is below the national average of 95%. A relevant number of them (44 local councils), 
particularly those located in the central and west parts of England, are facing major 
conservation issues, as the percentage area of SSSIs in positive condition is lower than 85%.  
3.3. Biodiversity Disclosure Index
Disclosure has been defined as an abstract concept that cannot be measured directly (Marston 
and Shivres, 1991). Despite this the extent of voluntary disclosure has been extensively 
investigated by using indirect, although subjective measures. Content analysis has been 
extensively used as an empirical research tool to measure disclosure in the field of financial 
reporting (e.g. Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Raffounier, 1995), and social and environmental 
reporting (e.g., Gray et al., 1995; Guthrie and Abseysekera, 2006; Guthrie & Parker, 1990; 
Patten, 2002). Content analysis involves “codifying qualitative information in anecdotal and 
literary form into categories in order to derive quantitative scales of varying levels of 
complexity” (Abbott and Monsen, 1979, p. 504). Various methods of content analysis can be 
used in order to evaluate disclosure. They range from the counting of words, sentences or 
paragraphs to the use of disclosure indexes that assess whether a specific item is disclosed. 
Disclosure indices are considered to be a valid research tool to assess the comprehensiveness 
of disclosure (Hooks & Van Staden, 2011) and have been used extensively in the accounting 
literature (e.g., Adler et al. 2018; Botosan, 1997; Cornier et al. 2005; Raffounier, 1995; 
Patelli and Prencipe, 2007). A disclosure index is usually constructed as a function of the 
number of the items provided in the annual reports (Botosan, 1997).
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This study uses a self-constructed disclosure index in order to evaluate the disclosure of 
biodiversity-related information by local authorities. Following previous studies (e.g., Patelli 
and Prencipe, 2007; Raffounier, 1995), to limit subjectivity, the selection of the items to be 
included in the index was based on the Guidance on Biodiversity published by UK 
Biodiversity Organisations (UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997; DEFRA, 2007). This provides 
local councils with recommendations on the biodiversity-related information to disclose. In 
selecting the items of the biodiversity disclosure index we also considered previous studies 
on biodiversity reporting (Atkins et al., 2014; Samkin et al., 2014; Shneider et al., 2014)
The primary sources of information used in this research were local authorities’ websites. As 
noted by Laswad et al. (2005) websites are one of the most effective tools to disclose 
information to the public. Moreover, websites are not only sources of information in their 
own right but also give access to formal accountability documents, such as biodiversity 
reports, biodiversity strategies, biodiversity action plans and other biodiversity-related 
publications (Schneider et al., 2014).
To ensure that all the information on biodiversity was captured, the following terms 
“biodiversity”, “biological diversity”, “natural environment”, “wildlife”, “habitat”, “species”, 
“habitat” “flora,” “fauna”, “environmental protection” and “environmental conservation” 
were used as keywords to search the local councils’ website. The keyword search was 
performed between December 2015 and February 2016. All the webpages and documents 
found were then further searched for the 31 items included in our Biodiversity Disclosure 
Index (BDI) (see table 2 for the list of items included in the BDI), divided into the following 
broad categories: a) Scene setting (7 items); b) Strategic planning (6 items); c) 
Implementation (10 items); and d) Evaluation (8 items).
A coding scheme was prepared to identify the classification criteria for each of the 31 items. 
Examples of narratives to be coded in each category-item were prepared and discussed before 
starting the analysis (Bozzolan et al., 2003). To test for the clarity and consistency of our 
categories and validate the coding scheme, the internet disclosure provided by five local 
councils were analysed and independently coded by two researchers. The results of the 
individual classifications were then compared and misalignments identified. Any discrepancy 
was re-analysed and resolved by discussion between the two researchers (e.g., Lee, 1999). 
Following this procedure, a final set of coding rules was defined. Subsequently, the internet 
disclosure of a further five local councils was analysed independently by two researchers. No 
further discrepancies emerged, it was thus deemed appropriate to have the disclosure of the 
remaining local councils analysed and coded by one researcher.
The items were scored using a binary coding system. We gave a score of 1 if there was 
information about the item and a score of 0 if there was no information. For each local 
council we computed a biodiversity disclosure index (BDI), calculated as the percentage ratio 
of the sum of the actual score awarded to the local council for each item of disclosure divided 
by the maximum possible potential score (Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Raffounier, 1995). The 
proportional score approach, allows comparable disclosure scores to be constructed for each 
local council.
3.4. Multivariate analysis
To investigate the potential factors that provide an incentive to the local councils to disclose 
biodiversity-related information we used the following OLS regression model:
𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑖 =  𝛼0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖+ 𝛽4𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖+ 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
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where i is the local council, β are the coefficients that measure the sensitivity of the 
Biodiversity Disclosure index (BDI) to the independent variables and γ is the coefficient that 
measures the sensitivity of the Biodiversity Disclosure index (BDI) to the control variables.
The dependent variable is the Biodiversity Disclosure Index (BDI) which is calculated as 
percentage ratio of the sum of the actual score awarded to the local authority for each item of 
disclosure divided by the maximum possible potential score. It takes values from 0 (no 
disclosure) to 100 (full disclosure).
The independent variables used to test our hypotheses were designed as follows:
- Population. This was measured as the natural logarithm of the number of inhabitants of the 
local council area.
- Political competition. This was measured as the percentage difference in the number of 
councillors elected from the winning party and the number of councillors elected from 
runner-up parties divided by the number of available positions in the council. Low scores are 
indicative of high political competition, while higher scores indicate low political 
competition.
- Political ideology. In England, the promotion of pro-environmental policies is at the core of 
the political vision of the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party. In comparison with the 
other English political parties, Liberal Democrats and the Green party have consistently given 
more prominence to the environment in their manifestos for a long time (Carter, 2013). Thus 
we estimated local councils’ political ideology as the percentage ratio between the local 
councillors appointed from either the Green party or the Liberal Democratic and the total 
number of councillors.
- Environmental NGOs. This was measured as the number of environmental NGOs registered 
in the local council area scaled by the area size of the local council.
- Poor biodiversity management. In England, natural protected areas are designed as Sites of 
Special Scientific Interest (SSSI). All SSSIs are divided into units and the conservation 
conditions of each unit is assessed separately and classified into one of the following six 
categories (Natural England, 2015): 1) Favourable, when the SSSI unit is being adequately 
conserved and is meeting its ‘objectives’; 2) Recovering, when the SSSI unit is not fully 
conserved but all the necessary management measures are in place and it is expected that the 
unit will reach favourable condition in time; 3) Unfavourable no change, when the unit is not 
being conserved and will not reach a favourable condition unless there are changes to the site 
management or external pressures. 4) Unfavourable declining, when the unit is not being 
conserved and its conditions are becoming progressively worse; it will not reach a favourable 
condition unless there are changes to site management or external pressures; 5) Partially 
destroyed, when lasting damage has occurred to part of the SSSI unit, such that it has been 
irretrievably lost and will never recover. 6) Destroyed, when lasting damage has occurred to 
the entire unit, such that it has been irretrievably lost. The last two categories are indicative of 
extremely poor biodiversity management, with no or inadequate conservation practices in 
place, which has led to permanent biodiversity losses with no possibility for the units to 
recover (Natural England, 2015). We thus measured poor biodiversity management as the 
percentage ratio of the hectares of the SSSIs classified as partially destroyed or destroyed 
over the total hectares of the SSSIs managed by the local council.
- Visibility. Local councils that operate in the London region are likely to enjoy greater 
visibility than those operating in the other English regions. London, the capital of England, is 
one of the world’s leading financial centres and an area in the world with one of the highest 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (OECD, 2006). It is thus more likely that local councils in 
London are subject to a greater public exposure and media coverage than those of the other 
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English regions. Visibility was thus estimated as a dichotomous variable which equals 1 if the 
local councils operate in the London area, and 0 otherwise.
The following control variables were considered:
- Local council area. Larger areas are likely to incorporate greater biodiversity. Greater 
biodiversity could require local councils to adopt more actions to protect and conserve local 
biodiversity. This might, in turn, favour an increase in the disclosure of biodiversity 
information. It was measured as the natural logarithm of the area, measured in hectares, 
administrated by the local council.
- SSSI. Local councils that manage larger areas which receive protection because of their 
recognised natural and ecological values might disclose more biodiversity information. They 
are more likely to have in place more policies aimed at conserving local biodiversity. This 
was measured as the percentage ratio of the hectares of the SSSIs present in the local council 
compared to the total hectares of the area administrated by the local council.
- Per capita income. Previous studies have found that government entities with a higher 
income per resident are likely to disclosure more information (Ingram, 1984; Piotrowski and 
Van Ryzin, 2007). It has been measured as the natural logarithm of the average income of the 
residents living in the local council area.
- Council type. English local councils can operate under either a one-tier structure or a two-
tier structure. While one-tier councils provide all the local services in the local area, in two-
tier councils the provision of local services is shared between two councils: county and 
district. As two-tier councils share the provision of local services, it might be possible that 
they also share the disclosure of information. Consequently, one-tier counties/districts might 
disclose less biodiversity information because the same information is disclosed at a 
district/county level. To control for this potential effect, we used a dichotomous variable 
which equals 1 if the local council has a two-tier structure and 0 otherwise.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics of local councils’ characteristics
Table 1 summarises the main characteristics of the local councils analysed.
On average the local councils analysed administrate an area of 62,276 hectares and serve a 
population of 211,641 inhabitants. Local councils’ residents have an average income of 
nearly £ 30,000. Less than 10% of the local councils analysed operate within the London area 
and most of them have a two-tier structure (65%). SSSIs represent on average 2.4% of the 
area managed by the local councils, with an average of 0.14% of these SSSIs being classified 
as partially destroyed or destroyed. The political ideology of the councils analysed is not very 
prominent, with Greens and Liberal Democrats representing on average nearly 13% of the 
local councils’ councillors. Political competition is on average not very high, with the 
percentage difference in the number of councillors elected from the winning party and the 
runner-up parties being on average 40%. On average, in the local councils analysed there is 
one local Environmental NGOs for every 10,000 hectares.
INSERT TABLE 1
4.2. Findings on biodiversity disclosure
Our findings show that as many as 179 out 351 English local councils do not report 
information on local biodiversity.3 They also reveal that the average level of biodiversity 
3 The timeliness of the information provided by local councils is a very important issue in evaluating the level of 
biodiversity disclosure. However, the dates of publication of the biodiversity information were not readily 
available on most of the websites analysed. This was different from biodiversity reports or biodiversity action 
plans. To make sure that our disclosure index picked up up-to-date information in relation to those items where 
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disclosure is quite low. Indeed, as shown in table 1, the Biodiversity Disclosure Index has an 
average level of 15.87% and ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 93.55%. Table 2 
reports the level of disclosure provide by English local councils detailed for the 31 items of 
the Biodiversity Disclosure Index, grouped into four main categories according to their 
nature.
INSERT TABLE 2
Biodiversity scene setting is the category of biodiversity-related information that is disclosed 
the most by English local councils. Within this category, the definition of biodiversity is the 
item that disclosed the most (42% of English local councils), followed by the 
acknowledgement of the broader problems of biodiversity loss (37%) the categorisation of 
the local council area by type of habitat (37%) and the regulatory framework for the 
biodiversity action (33%). By contrast, the main factors that threated local biodiversity are 
disclosed less (21%). Urban development, intensive farming, pollution, invasive species and 
inappropriate management of wetland areas are among the most disclosed biodiversity 
threats. For instance the North East Derbyshire District Council (2016) stated in its website 
that: “key wildlife habitats have been lost for a number of reasons including intensive 
farming, road and housing development and through the introduction of foreign species, 
which has had a devastating effect on many native species”.
Less than one third of the local councils analysed (33%) provided information on the local 
sites of natural interest existent in their areas. Local councils that disclose this information 
usually provide information on sites of regional importance such as the Site of Importance for 
Nature Conservation (SINC) and/or on sites of national importance such the Site of Special 
Scientific Interest (SSSI) and Local Nature Reserves (LNR). A map showing the locations of 
such sites is however less frequently reported (24%). The Bracknell Forest Council is an 
example of one local council that provided detailed information on these sites and shows the 
location of these sites in the council area (see figure 2).
INSERT FIGURES 2
Biodiversity strategic planning was disclosed by less than 20% of the local councils (see table 
2). Sixty local councils (l7%) explained the vision of the strategy to conserve biodiversity, 
while the main objectives of these strategies and the time period during which such objectives 
should be achieved were disclosed in 56 (16%) and 54 (15%) cases respectively. For 
example, the Oxford City Council (2015, p. 15) stated that the vision of its biodiversity 
conservation strategy is: “to ensure that Oxford City Council enables a future, rich in wildlife, 
where people can enjoy climate resilient, healthy and species rich ecosystems which 
contribute to the conservation of biodiversity in all its forms”. Biodiversity strategies contain 
in most of the cases general objectives aimed to: ‘conserve and enhance the variety of wild 
species and natural habitats’, ‘to collect data and map local biodiversity’ and ‘to increase 
public awareness of, and involvement in, conserving biodiversity’. 
How the local councils planned to achieve these objectives was disclosed less frequently 
(only by 31 out 351 local councils). An example of this type of disclosure has been found in 
the Biodiversity Action Plan of Chichester District Council (CDC). One main objective of 
timeliness is important (e.g. items related to sections B. Strategic planning, C. Implementation and D. 
Evaluation), we have considered only information referred to a current period of time at the time when the data 
collection was performed. Only when timeliness of information was not relevant (e.g. for information related 
section A. on biodiversity scene setting) we considered also sources of information where the date when the 
information was published was not available.
Page 16 of 41Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal17
this action plan is the creation of an accurate picture of local biodiversity with the outcome of 
establishing and maintaining “a comprehensive record of the presence and location of 
important habitats and species within the District” (Chichester District Council, 2015, p. 1). 
The council stated that it aimed to pursue this objective by undertaking the following actions: 
“continue to support the Sussex Biodiversity Record Centre (SBRC) in its role as a repository 
for all species and habitat data in the District through our Service Level Agreement; … 
support the transition of Chichester’s Ecological Network Maps on to CDC’s General 
Mapping System so that they can be used throughout the organisation” (Chichester District 
Council, 2015, p. 1). Specific strategies aimed at conserving endangered local habitats and 
species were rarely published, only 43 (12%) and 30 (9%) local councils provided this 
information, respectively.
Implementation was generally less frequently disclosed than both scene-setting and strategic 
planning. Sixty-one local councils (17%) disclosed the name of the local partners (such as 
local authorities, statutory and voluntary agencies or NGOs) involved in protecting local 
biodiversity and of these, only 48 (14%) described the contribution made by these partners to 
the achievement of the main objectives of the biodiversity strategy.
The criteria used to identify local priority habitats and priority species were disclosed by very 
few local councils (around 12%). For example, Harrow Borough Council listed the following 
criteria for selecting priority species: “All London priority species, especially if there is much 
potential locally to contribute towards national species targets; Species virtually unique to the 
borough or London with a significant proportion of the national population and Species 
declining, assessed where possible over the last 25 years” (Harrow Borough Council, 2015, p. 
26).
There was very little disclosure (less than 7%) of the proposals and actions already 
undertaken to conserve priority habitat and species. Examples of these sporadic disclosures 
include those provided by the Central Bedfordshire Council, which, in relation to the 
protection of orchard habitats stated that: “The People’s Trust for Endangered Species 
(PTES) is undertaking a Traditional Orchard Survey to understand where traditional orchards 
remain and what condition they are in in order to better protect them” (Central Bedfordshire 
Council, 2015, p. 45). Disclosure of actions already undertaken to conserve priority species 
were found in the Biodiversity Action Plan of the Oxford City Council which stated: 
“Ecological surveys submitted with applications are scrutinised by a professional ecologist 
and conditions are used to secure mitigation or enhancement where this is appropriate. 
Oxford City Council uses GIS to flag up key biodiversity information such as designated sites 
and protected and notable species and habitats” (Oxford City Council, 2015, p. 22). 
Proposals for raising public awareness and the processes used to monitor the progress 
achieved in the implementation of the strategy were disclosed slightly more (respectively by 
11% and 14% of the local councils). Examples of disclosure on proposals for raising public 
awareness have been found in the website of the Arun District Council (2016) which stated 
that it aims to raise awareness of biodiversity importance “through education, social activity, 
research and other appropriate means”. Descriptions of processes used to monitor the 
progress achieved in the implementation of biodiversity conservation strategy have been 
found in the website of the Sheffield Metropolitan Council (2015), which for this purpose 
mainly relies on the Sheffield Biological Records Centre (SBRC). In particular, it stated that 
they evaluate the efficacy of conservation efforts by “using the data in SBRC and through 
undertaking annual habitat and species surveys on local nature reserves and local wildlife 
sites”.
Interestingly, information about the main sources of funding of biodiversity conservation 
actions and the estimates of the associated costs were rarely disclosed. Only 5% and 2%, 
respectively, of the local councils analysed provided such disclosures. For example, the 
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Harrow Borough Council in its Biodiversity Action Plan (2015, p. 26) stated that “Most of 
the actions in the BAP can be met from existing revenue and capital budget of the Council. 
Where the need for additional funding has been identified or becomes apparent during the 
course of this plan, this will be sought from external sources identified under funding strategy 
… and any other funders that become available during the term of this plan”. It also provides 
details of ‘cost implication’ of the actions planned to achieve biodiversity conservation. For 
instance, it disclosed that ‘cost implication’ for the survey to “Review Local SINC 
designations through the Local Plan” … “are estimated at £ 45,000” (Harrow Borough 
Council, 2015, p. 36).
Disclosure of the evaluation of biodiversity is generally poor. The names of local priority 
habitats and local priority species (i.e. local habitats/species threatened of biodiversity loss 
and requiring conservation) were the information disclosed the most, respectively by 109 
(32%) and 90 (26%) local councils. Local councils disclosed whether these priority habitats 
and species were also considered priority habitats and species at national levels less often 
(only in 14% and 12% of the cases analysed, respectively). Very few local councils (8%) 
disclosed specific details of the local priority species living in local priority habitats. An 
example of this disclosure is provided in figure 3 found in the Biodiversity Action Plan of the 
Wakefield Metropolitan Council (2015, p. 30).
INSERT FIGURE 3
The disclosure of the size of these priority habitats and the population of these priority 
species was generally neglected. Only 41 (12%) and 12 (3%) local councils, respectively, 
disclosed such information. The lack of information on these categories could be due to data 
unavailability. Indeed, several local councils acknowledged the incompleteness of data 
mapping of local biodiversity and had as one main objective of their biodiversity strategies 
the collection of data to record the presence, location and size of priority habitats and species. 
Hopefully, the achievement of this objective will lead to an improvement in the disclosure of 
location and size of priority habitats and species. So far only 18 local councils (5%) reported 
information on the progress achieved in the implementation of their biodiversity strategies. 
Cherwell District Council is one of the few councils that disclosed this kind of information. 
For each of the main objectives of its strategy, it disclosed the progress achieved so far. For 
instance, in relation to the objective to “Support and promote initiatives to encourage 
involvement in the natural environment and improve public understanding of biodiversity”, 
the council had the target to “Organise and promote a Countryside Forum - attendance > 50, 
satisfaction rating >75%” and stated that “The target was not achieved” because, as explained 
by the council “staff resource for this was too limited” (Cherwell District Council, 2015, p. 
23).
4.3. Univariate and multivariate analysis
Table 3 reports the correlations between all the variables used in the analysis. It shows that 
the level of Biodiversity Disclosure is significantly positively associated with the number of 
inhabitants of the local councils, the presence of local Environmental NGOs, poor 
biodiversity management, the visibility of the local councils and their per capita income, 
while it is significantly negatively associated with the two-tier local council structure. Some 
significant and highly correlated coefficients (>|0.4|) have been found between the 
independent variables, in particular between the variables Visibility, Environmental NGOs, 
local council area, Environmental NGOs, Per capita income and Two-tier council. Despite 
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the presence of these correlations, multicollinearity is unlikely to be a concern as the VIF 
values4 (see table 4) are lower than 2.5 (Gujarati, 2009).
INSERT TABLE 3
Table 4 reports the results of the regression analyses performed in order to test our 
hypotheses.
INSERT TABLE 4
Our results provide support for all the six hypotheses tested, except for H2. Local councils’ 
political ideology (H3) and visibility (H6) seem to be the most significant drivers of 
biodiversity disclosure in the English public sector, followed by the presence of 
Environmental NGOs in the local council area (H5), poor biodiversity management (H4) and 
the number of local councils’ inhabitants (H1). By contrast, the level of political competitions 
within local councils does not seem to have a significant impact on biodiversity disclosure. 
Indeed, table 4 shows that biodiversity disclosure is significantly higher in local councils 
where the presence of councillors elected from environmentally-oriented parties is greater. 
The coefficient of the variable political ideology is positive and significant (Z = 2.59, p .01), 
providing support to H3. The citizens of councils where environmentally-oriented parties are 
more represented give greater importance to environmental values than other political issues. 
In line with the assumptions of stakeholders, legitimacy and institutional theories, our results 
suggest that local councils with a greater representation of environmentally-oriented parties 
disclose more information on biodiversity to show their citizens their compliance with the 
values of the society they represent. 
Table 4 also shows that biodiversity disclosure is significantly higher in local councils based 
in the London area (Z = 3.59, p .01), giving empirical support to H6. This is probably 
because these councils are subjected to a higher visibility than councils located in the other 
English area. This result supports legitimacy theory, according to which organisations’ 
visibility increases organisations’ need to seek legitimacy and use disclosure as an 
instrumental response to legitimacy pressure. 
Our results also show that biodiversity disclosure is significantly higher in local councils 
where biodiversity has been poorly managed (Z = 2.32, p .05). H5 is thus supported. The 
presence of protected sites with irretrievably lasting damages in the local council area has 
been considered as an indicator of poor biodiversity management. This result also supports 
the assumption of legitimacy theory, by suggesting that local councils where biodiversity has 
been poorly managed use biodiversity disclosure to reduce external criticism of their 
biodiversity strategies and to restore their legitimacy. 
In line with stakeholder theory, table 4 also shows that the presence of Environmental NGOs 
is positively and significantly associated with a greater level of disclosure of biodiversity-
related information (Z = 2.25, p .05), providing support for H4.  Local environmental NGOs 
are powerful stakeholders concerned about the conservation of local biodiversity. English 
local councils might disclose more information on biodiversity when NGOs are present to 
discharge their accountability toward these environmental oriented stakeholders.
Table 4 also shows that the coefficient of the variable Population is positive and significant 
(Z = 1.95, p.1), giving empirical support to H1. Highly populated local councils are likely to 
disclose more biodiversity information. This result is in line with agency theory which 
4 Variance inflation factors (VIFs) are the ratios of variance in a model with multiple terms, divided by the 
variance of a model with one term alone. They are used to quantify the severity of multicollinearity in an OLS 
regression analysis (Gujarati, 2009).
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suggests that in the presence of greater information asymmetry, as in councils with more 
population, the demand for information is higher. Local councils responded to this demand 
by disclosing more information on biodiversity in their websites. 
However, we did not find support for H2. Our results show that biodiversity disclosure is 
higher when political competition is lower, although not significantly. This could be because 
in a situation of low competition, the governing party is more confident of its position and, 
consequently keener to disclose information.
All together these results show that biodiversity disclosure seems to be driven by social 
incentives. Local councils use biodiversity disclosure to satisfy the information needs of their 
citizens and stakeholders and to show compliance with the expectations of the society in 
which they operate and the communities which they represent.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
This study explores the extent of biodiversity reporting within the English local government 
using a multi-theoretical framework composed of agency, stakeholder, legitimacy and 
institutional theories. It investigates the factors associated with the level of biodiversity 
disclosure. By investigating biodiversity reporting in organisations operating in the public 
sector, this study extends the literature on sustainability accounting which has investigated 
mostly the corporate sector and has largely ignored public sector biodiversity issues.
This study’s main results show that the importance of biodiversity is not acknowledged by 
the majority of the local councils analysed. The information they disclose does not allow 
interested stakeholders to get a comprehensive picture of the current status and future 
development of local biodiversity. The extent of biodiversity disclosure found in the context 
of English local councils is lower than the level of disclosure found by previous studies 
conducted in the public sector (Barut and Azim, 2016) and in the corporate sector (e.g. Adler 
et al., 2018; Atkins et al., 2014; Rimmel and Jonäll, 2013). English local councils 
demonstrate a weak response to the demand for accountability and transparency on 
biodiversity. As stated by Jones (2014) one essential aspect of biodiversity accounting is the 
disclosure of biodiversity information. Local councils should act as stewards of the 
environment and have regard to the conservation of biodiversity in order to guarantee the 
well-being of the communities they represent. How and to what extent local councils disclose 
biodiversity-related information is thus extremely important in order to evaluate their 
stewardship (Jones, 2003; 2014; Schneider et al. 2014).
Empirical results suggest that most local councils do not provide sufficient information to 
allow an assessment of their accountability. Most local councils do not report any information 
about local biodiversity. When disclosed, biodiversity information is limited. Relevant 
aspects such as the current status of habitats and species threatened, particularly in terms of 
size and population, are generally ignored. Moreover, while several councils outline generic 
objectives and tables of actions to be met in order to conserve and maintain biodiversity, 
almost no local council disclosed information on how they implement such policies and 
action plans and on the progress achieved in pursuing their strategic objectives. This aspect 
raises the concern that local council might use biodiversity reporting as a tool to manage their 
stakeholders’ impression rather than to improve transparency, in line with the findings of 
Boiral (2016) in the private sector.
Our study is, to our knowledge, one of the first that provides empirical evidence of the factors 
that affect the extent of biodiversity disclosure. It shows that, as predicted, the differences 
that exist among English local councils regarding their biodiversity disclosures practices are 
explainable by economic and social theories. In line with agency theory (Zimmerman, 1977), 
we found that biodiversity disclosure is significantly higher in local councils with a higher 
population. We also found that biodiversity disclosure is significantly associated with the 
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political ideology of the local community, the presence of Environmental NGOs, poor 
biodiversity management practices and the visibility of the local council. These results are in 
line with the assumptions of social theories, such as stakeholder, legitimacy and institutional 
theories, which explain the disclosure of information as a tool used to manage the 
relationships between organisations, the state, individuals and groups (Campbell, 2007; 
Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; Gray, 1995; Guthrie and Parker, 1989). In determining their 
biodiversity disclosure, local councils consider their institutional context (i.e. the 
environmental values of the community they represent) and the interest of their stakeholders.  
Local councils need their stakeholders (such as voters, environmental NGOs and local 
communities) to support the biodiversity conservation strategies adopted, and try to obtain 
this support by disclosing biodiversity related information. Local councils seem to use 
biodiversity disclosure as part of the dialogue between them and their stakeholder for double 
purposes: to inform the latter about the (actual) changes in their biodiversity performance and 
activities and also to seek to change their perceptions on their biodiversity management 
strategies, when their biodiversity management has been poor. Biodiversity disclosure is used 
by local councils to satisfy the information needs of their stakeholders and assure them that 
their strategies and practices conform to their values and expectations. In doing so, local 
councils present an environmentally responsible image to their community, legitimise their 
behaviours to their main stakeholder groups and influence their external perception of 
reputation. 
Overall our findings expand the emergent literature on biodiversity reporting in different 
ways (e.g. Adler, 2017, 2018; Atkins et al., 2014; Barut and Azim, 2016; Boiral, 2016; Gaia 
and Jones, 2017 Rimmel and Jonäll, 2013; Samkin et al., 2014; Schneider et al., 2014; van 
Liempd and Busch, 2013). First, our study contributes to this literature as it contains new and 
significant information on the nature and content of biodiversity disclosures in the public 
sector and provides a self-constructed disclosure index that may provide an important 
reference for future studies of biodiversity disclosures. Second, it enhances our understanding 
of the responsibilities of public sector agencies for the management of biodiversity, which is 
a growing area of work in the field of accounting and a central challenge of sustainability 
development. Third, it is to our knowledge one of the first studies that, using a theoretical 
framework that relies on economic and social theories, empirically investigates the factors 
associated with the disclosure of information on biodiversity. In this way, it also contributes 
to the scant literature on sustainability reporting in the public sector (e.g. Guthrie and Farneti, 
2008; Guthrie et al., 2010; Joseph et al, 2014; Linch, 2010; Sanchez, 2013; Tagesson et al., 
2013). It shows that the disclosure of biodiversity information by local councils is explained 
by their need to conform with society and to satisfy the information needs of the relevant 
stakeholders.
As with any study, we acknowledge that this study is subject to a number of limitations. First, 
we analysed biodiversity reporting in a single institutional setting. Although the results 
derived from English local councils can be generalised to other developed countries a more 
comprehensive portrait would be obtained by studying additional countries. Second, this 
study assumes that the websites of local councils are the primary medium for communicating 
biodiversity information. Our assumption is based on fact that the Environmental Information 
Regulations (EIR) 2004 requires public authorities to disclose environmental information 
using electronic means, whenever possible. For this reason, it is likely that local councils use 
mainly their websites to report biodiversity-related information to the citizens. However, it is 
possible that local councils disclosed biodiversity-related information using other means that 
were not accessible through their websites, such as printed documents, letters or emails, or 
that were not captured by our disclosure index, such as sound or video recordings. Future 
studies might investigate disclosure in the public sectors by analysing these other means of 
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disclosure. Third, our study focused on the level of disclosure provided by local councils, but 
not whether (and how) they ‘managed’ biodiversity disclosures through impression 
management techniques. Indeed, Boiral (2016) found that corporations use biodiversity 
disclosure positively to manage the stakeholders’ impressions, rather than to improve 
transparency. Further research might address this issue in the public sector. Fourth, our study 
has mainly focused on how accountability relations between politicians, citizens and 
environmental NGOs shape biodiversity disclosure. However, local council information 
disclosure might be affected also by accountability relations with other relevant stakeholders, 
such as national governments. Future studies should take these accountability relationships 
with other stakeholders into account in investigating disclosure in the public sector. 
Last but not least, we acknowledge that most of our hypotheses would greatly benefit from 
being tested against complementary qualitative studies that interview local councils’ 
representatives to investigate their perceptions on the role played by the factors analysed in 
this study on the development of biodiversity reporting practices. Future research is also 
encouraged in this perspective.
In spite of these limitations, this study provides valuable insights and has a number of 
relevant practical and policymaking implications. By showing evidence of the limited 
disclosures on biodiversity provided by English local councils, this study suggests that the 
current provisions by policymakers to place a duty on local authorities to have regard of 
biodiversity is not sufficient. They should also mandate that these authorities should publish 
periodical reports aimed at informing their citizens on the current status of local biodiversity, 
the actions undertaken to preserve the biodiversity and the progress achieved in this direction.
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Figure 1: Map of English Local councils classified according the status on their SSSI. 
Source: Our elaboration using the data available from Natural England (2015). 
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Figure 2: Example of a biodiversity maps showing the locations of the sites of natural 
interest in the local council’s area. Source: Bracknell Forest Council (2012, p. 91).
Page 32 of 41Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal33
Figure 3: Examples of disclosure of the local priority species living in local priority habitats
Source: Wakefield Metropolitan Council (2015, p. 30).
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
BDI 15.87 22.84 0.00 93.55
Population 211,640.90 213,374.90 34,675.00 1,500,000.00
Political competition 40.05 24.83 0.00 100.00
Political ideology 12.80 15.08 0.00 90.91
Environmental NGOs 0.0001 0.0001 0.00 0.0004
Poor biodiversity management 0.14 0.97 0.00 14.35
Visibility 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
Local council area 62,276.17 104,779.00 1,213.00 803,761.00
SSSI 2.42 4.65 0.00 53.57
Per capita income 29,966.95 9,389.88 20,400.00 131,000.00
Two-tier council 0.65 0.48 0 1
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Table 2 – Biodiversity disclosure index – breakdown per subcategories
1. Scene setting No %* %** Source
Biodiversity definition 149 42.45 86.63 Atkins et al., (2014)
Acknowledgement of the broader problems of biodiversity loss 130 37.04 75.58 Samkin et al (2014); Schneider et al. (2014)
Broad categorisation of the local council area by habitat type 130 37.04 75.58 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997
Regulatory Framework 116 33.05 67.44 Samkin et al (2014)
Information about local sites of natural interest present in the council area 116 33.05 67.44 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997; Schneider et al. 
(2014)
A biodiversity maps showing locations of the above key areas 84 23.93 48.84 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997
Review of generic issues affecting biodiversity within the local area 73 20.8 42.44 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997
2. Strategic planning     
The vision 60 17.09 34.88 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997; DEFRA, 2007; 
Atkins et al., (2014); Samkin et al (2014)
The strategical objectives 56 15.95 32.56 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997; DEFRA, 2007; 
Schneider et al. (2014)
The time-horizon 54 15.38 31.4 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997
Presence of specific habitats action plans 43 12.25 25 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997
Recommended actions to achieve the strategical objectives 31 8.83 18.02 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997; DEFRA, 2007
Presence of specific species action plans 30 8.55 17.44 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997
3. Implementation     
Indication of the partner involved in the strategy implementation 61 17.38 35.47 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997; DEFRA, 2007; 
Atkins et al., (2014); Samkin et al (2014)
Processes used to monitor the progresses of the strategy 50 14.25 29.07 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997; Samkin et al 
(2014); 
Description of the work of the partnership 48 13.68 27.91 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997
The criteria used to identify local priority habitats 43 12.25 25 UK LIAG, 1997
The criteria used to identify local priority species 41 11.68 23.84 UK LIAG, 1997
Proposals for raising public awareness on biodiversity importance 40 11.4 23.26 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997; DEFRA, 2007
Action already underway to meet the conservation requirement of the priority habitats 25 6.98 14.24 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997; DEFRA, 2007
Action already underway to meet the conservation requirement of the priority species 22 6.13 12.5 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997; DEFRA, 2007
Source of funding 18 5.13 10.47 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997
Estimates costs 6 1.71 3.49 Atkins et al., (2014); Samkin et al (2014)
4. Evaluation     
Identification of the priority habitats of the local council area 109 31.05 63.37 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997
Identification of the priority species of the local council area 90 25.64 52.33 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997
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Whether the priorities habitat of the local council area are also priority habitat at 
national level 
49 13.82 28.2 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997; DEFRA, 2007
Whether the priorities species of the local council area also priority species at national 
level
44 12.39 25.29 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997; DEFRA, 2007
Size of the priority habitats 44 12.39 25.29 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997
List of priority species in priority habitats 28 7.83 15.99 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997
Progress achieved in the implementation of the strategy 18 5.13 10.47 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997; Atkins et al., 
(2014); Samkin et al (2014); Schneider et al. (2014)
Population of the priorities species of the local council area 12 3.28 6.69 UKBG, 1995; UK LIAG, 1997
Notes:
* Percentage calculated on the total local councils analysed (351)
**Percentage calculated on the local councils that disclosed at least some biodiversity information (172)
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Table 3 – Correlation matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. BDI 1
2. Population 0.1912* 1
3. Political competition 0.0812 0.0062 1
4. Political ideology 0.0891 -0.0224 -0.2410* 1
5. Environmental NGOs 0.1377* -0.0499 0.0667 -0.0288 1
6. Poor biodiversity management 0.1149* 0.0757 0.0553 -0.0274 -0.0341 1
7. Visibility 0.2710* 0.1583* 0.1274 -0.1257 0.4277* -0.0478 1
8. Local council area -0.0746 0.2967* -0.1788* 0.0876 -0.3889* 0.0146 -0.4301* 1
9. SSSI -0.0631 -0.0958 -0.1115 0.0888 -0.0516 -0.0283 -0.0884 0.1072 1
10. Per capita income 0.1708* -0.0754 0.0825 0.0815 0.5456* -0.0788 0.3726* -0.1056 -0.0675 1
11. Two-tier council -0.1772* -0.3480* -0.1269 0.1246 -0.2197* -0.094 -0.4337* 0.3598* 0.0144 0.0196 1
* p < 0.01
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Table 4 – Regression analyses
Hypotheses Expected sign Independent and control variables Z value
H1 + Population 1.95 *
H2 - Political competition 1.20
H3 + Political ideology 2.59 ***
H4 + Environmental NGOs 2.25 **
H5 + Poor Biodiversity Management 2.32 **
H6 + Visibility 3.59 ***
Local council area 0.01
SSSI -0.79
Per capita income 1.51
Two-tier council -0.52
Constant -1.64
No Obs 351
R2 0.1364
F 5.37 ***
Average VIF 1.34
Max VIF 1.92
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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entitled "Biodiversity reporting. Evidence from English local councils"
Reviewer # 1 comments Our responses
I have carefully looked at the responses from the authors 
and the changes and additions they have made in their 
manuscript, and I am satisfied with them. I thus would 
like to recommend the paper for publication. Thank you 
for giving me the opportunity to review this interesting 
paper. 
We are happy that you are satisfied with our responses 
and the amendments made on the previous version of the 
paper. Thank you for your very useful comments. 
Reviewer # 2 comments Our responses
We thank Reviewer # 2 for the helpful and insightful 
comments on our paper. We detail below how we have dealt 
with each comment.
In the abstract, the authors may wish to clarify how 
their work contributes to specific theories rather than 
using the generic term 'economic and social theories'. 
We have now added this comment to the end of the abstract 
thus making it more specific. 
Section 2 'Theoretical Framework' has improved 
substantially. Could the authors ensure that they explain 
how specific theories have informed each hypothesis? This 
is mostly visible, however it is less clear in relation 
to hypotheses 2 and 3. Similarly, it would be useful to 
include a short summary of how you have integrated these 
different theoretical perspectives in the generation of 
hypotheses at the end of section 2 prior to detailing the 
methodology. Such a summary could comment further on the 
ways in which the theories interact and complement each 
other elaborating on the point made on page 5, lines 27-
28. 
Thank you for your valuable comment. We have taken your 
suggestions into account by explaining how specific 
theories have informed each hypothesis, focussing in 
particular on hypotheses 2 and 3. Please see p. 6. 
We have also included a summary at the end of section 2, 
by creating a new paragraph 2.7 (please see p. 8) where 
we have explained how these theories interact and 
complement each other. In this summary we have explained 
that our hypotheses are mainly informed by agency and 
stakeholder theories as these theories explain the 
relationship between politicians and citizens and other 
stakeholders as an agency/stakeholder relationship were 
the politicians are the agents acting in the interest of 
the citizens (principals) and the other stakeholders. 
Disclosure is used by politicians to show that they 
satisfy the interest of citizens and stakeholders. Thus, 
disclosure increases when the demand of information is 
higher (more citizens, more stakeholders interested on 
biodiversity e.g. environmental NGOs) or when political 
competition is higher as the need to satisfy the interest 
of voters becomes more prominent. These theories are then 
complemented by institutional and legitimacy theories, as 
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we argue that the need to satisfy these actors might be 
driven not only by the mere fact that they monitor 
politicians because of the potential agency conflict but 
also because politicians want to show them that they 
comply with the values of the community they represent 
and want to maintain legitimacy among them. 
Hope these amendments satisfy your expectations.  
Thank you for providing more detailed information both 
the institutional setting for local councils with regards 
biodiversity and reflection on the reliance on local 
authorities websites as the primary source for 
biodiversity information. Could the authors suggest other 
forms of disclosure that local authorities may be using? 
Also, could the authors consider the extent to which 
local authorities and elected politicians have other 
accountability relations to other stakeholders (e.g. 
national governments) and the extent to which such 
relations may need to be taken into account in future 
examinations of disclosure? Stakeholder theory suggests 
that organisations may be accountable to multiple 
stakeholders and you have identified citizens and 
environmental NGOs in this project. It might be useful to 
also discuss the extent to which national governments, as 
another stakeholder, shape disclosure. 
Thank you for your comment. 
In the revised version of the paper, we have identified 
different forms of disclosure, including video, audio 
recording, printed documents and letters that the local 
councils might use to inform their stakeholders. We have 
now illustrated them in the conclusion of the paper 
(please see p. 21), suggesting future studies to consider 
them when investigating disclosure in the public sector. 
Thank you for suggesting us to consider national 
governments as other stakeholders that could shape local 
council disclosure. This is definitely a very interesting 
suggestion and we think future studies should consider 
their roles in shaping local councils’ disclosure. To 
address your comments, we have listed as one of the 
limitations of our study the fact that we are considering 
mainly citizens and environmental NGOs as the most 
relevant stakeholders of this study. We have acknowledged 
that other stakeholders, National Government in 
particular, could shape local council disclosure and 
suggested future research to consider the role played by 
National Government in local council disclosure (please 
see p. 22). 
Finally, to strengthen the recommendation for local 
authorities to be required to periodically disclose 
biodiversity information, could the authors provide some 
details of the timeliness of the information provided by 
local authorities? As it stands, it is not clear whether 
the information gathered is published in a particular 
year or has been on the website for a undisclosed period 
of time. If information has not been updated for a long 
period of time, this may raise further questions about 
the extent to which local authorities are meeting their 
We do agree that identifying the timeliness of the 
information available on webpages is important. We did 
take into account the issue of timeliness of the 
information provided by the local councils when we 
analysed the websites. We have mainly considered up to 
date information to evaluate the level of disclosure 
provided by local councils. This applies for the 
information related to sections B. Strategic planning, C. 
Implementation and D. Evaluation of our bi diversity 
disclosure index. When we evaluated the level of 
Page 40 of 41Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal3
biodiversity duty.  I understand that dates of 
publication may not be readily available on websites, 
especially for webpage content compared to reports. 
However, insights into identifying the timeliness of 
information available on webpages would be important for 
those wishing to conduct similar research in the future.
disclosure within these areas we have assigned scores of 
1 only when the information referred to a current period 
of time at the time when the data collection was 
performed (e.g. the website stated the information was 
related to the period 2015-2016 or the information was 
found in a strategic plan for the period 2012-2017 or a 
biodiversity report for the period 2013-2015). We have 
not been so strict in relation to the first area of 
disclosure of the biodiversity index “A. Scene settings”, 
as for the items included in this area (e.g. Biodiversity 
definition; Acknowledgement of the broader problems of 
biodiversity loss) we thought that the issue of timeless 
was less important, as the type of information will not 
significantly change over time. So for these items we 
also assigned score 1 when we did not have information of 
the date when the information was published. We have 
clarified this aspect and provided more detailed 
information on the data collection in the section 4.2 
Findings on biodiversity disclosure at p. 15 and 16 of 
the revised paper. Thank you for pointing this out.
Please review the manuscript for some minor spelling and 
grammatical errors. For example, 
page 11, line 24 - 'The report also shows' instead of 
'The report also show' 
page 11, line 41 - 'There are now' instead of 'There are 
row' 
page 13, line 15 - check section numbering for 
'Multivariate analysis' section heading. 
page 10, lines 32-34 - check this sentence for sense 
'However, according to the Environmental Information 
Regulations (EIR) 2004, that discipline that public 
access to environmental information held by local 
authorities...'.
Thank you for identifying these spelling and grammatical 
errors. We have corrected them in the revised version of 
the paper. 
Page 41 of 41 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
